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Nast v. Lockett: PUNmVE DAMAGES
PERMITTED IN AUTOMOBILE
NEGLIGENCE CASE WHERE
DEFENDANT WAS BOTH
INTOXICATED AND EXHIBITED A
WANTON AND RECKLESS
DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE.
In Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d
1113 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held it reversible error to withhold the issue of punitive damages from
the jury in a civil automobile accident
action where there existed sufficient evidence that an intoxicated driver exhibited
a wanton and reckless disregard for human
life.
On the evening of February 17, 1984,
Edward Nast ("Nast"), Lois Lockett
("Lockett"),
and
Charles
Houck
("Houck") were traveling on York Road,
a four-lane thoroughfare in Baltimore
County. Nast was proceeding south
behind Lockett's vehicle. Houck was
traveling north on York Road. Lockett
attempted to make a U-turn onto the
northbound lane, but was unable to complete the turn without hitting the curb.
Lockett then came to a full stop, and backed up in order to complete the turn.
Houck continued without braking or deviating from his course, careened of Lockett's car into the southbound lane off York
Road, and struck the vehicle driven by
Nast. Nast sustained personal injuries and
property damage as a result of the colliSIon.
Nast, and his wife, who was a passenger
in his car at the time of the accident,
entered suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking compensatory and
punitive damages from Lockett and
Houck based on drunken and negligent
driving. The judge prevented the issue of
punitive damages from deliberation before
the jury due to insufficient proof of wanton and willful disregard for human life.
The jury awarded the N asts compensatory
damages to be paid by each defendant. The
Nasts appealed to the court of special
appeals on the issue of punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on
their own motion, certified the case to
consider the question of whether the lower
court erred in withholding from the jury
the issue of punitive damages. Id at 348,
539 A.2d at 1115-16.
The question of whether to award
punitive damages is considered by the factfinder only if the evidence is sufficient to
bring the issue before the finder of fact.
The actual award of such damages is then
left to the discretion of the factfinder. The
court of appeals thus sought to determine
whether the trial court was "right," or

"wrong" in withholding the issue of
punitive damages from the jury. Id at 349,
539 A.2d at 1116.
The court began its analysis by explaining the criterion for awarding damages in
Maryland. Compensatory damages are
awarded "[a]s compensation, indemnity,
or restitution for harm sustained ... " Id. at
348, 539 A.2d at 1116, (citing McAlister v.
Car~ 233 Md. 446, 451-57, 197 A.2d 140
(1964». A finding of negligence and compensable loss are conditions precedent to
consideration of the issue of punitive
damages. Id. 349, 539 A.2d 113, 114-16,
(citing Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631,
644, 291 A.2d 64 (1972)). Punitive damages
are thereby awarded not as the measure of
actual loss, but "as punishment for outrageous conduct and to deter future transagressions." Id. (citing Black's Law
Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis
added).
Initially, the standard regarding entitlement of punitive damages required an element of fraud, malice, evil intent or
oppression entering into and forming part
of the wrongful act. Philadelphia, W. &
B.R.R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307
(1884). This rule, however, was supplanted
in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267
Md. 149,297 A.2d 721 (1972), wherein the
court held that punitive damages in motor
vehicle cases should be based on the standard applied in the crime of manslaughter
by automobile.
The statute creating the crime of manslaughter by automobile dictates that
"[e]very person causing the death of
another as a result of driving ... of an automobile ... in a grossly negligent manner,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be
known as 'manslaughter by automobile ... '" Md. Code Ann, art. 27, §388
(1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.). Decisions interpreting the statute therefore require proof
of gross negligence, which has been defined as "a wanton or reckless disregard for
human life" in the operation of a motor
vehicle, the requisites of which are knowledge of the dangers and risks attendant to
such conduct. The court in Smith further
observed that since the requirement of
gross negligence was adequately stringent
to impose imprisonment, it was sufficient
to form the basis of an award of punitive
damages. Smith 267 Md. at 168,297 A.2d
at 832.
The standard of gross negligence is therefore met if the driver exhibited an extraordinary or outrageous lack of concern for
the safety of others. The court determined
that "[i]t is not reckless driving that allows
punitive damages; it is the reckless disregard for human life." The determination
thereof must be made "in light of evidence

adduced at the trial tending to show that
Lockett and Houck had consumed alcoholic beverages shortly before their fortuitous meeting on York Road, and evidence
regarding their condition as a result of
their drinking." Id. at 352, 539 A.2d at
1117-18.
In Maryland, it is a misdemeanor to
drive any vehicle while intoxicated, or
under the influence of alcohol. Md.
Transp. Code Ann. §21-902 (1977, 1982
Repl. Vol.). The amount of alcohol in the
blood of the drinking driver is admissible
in both civil and criminal trials in order to
show the degree of impairment of the
driver. Unlike criminal causes, however,
the percentage of alcohol in the blood does
not give rise to any presumptions in civil
actions. The plaintiffs in civil cases therefore have the burden of persuasion as to
the degree of the defendant's impairment.
Nast, 312 Md. 353, 539 A.2d at 1119,
(citing Major v. State, .31 Md. App. 590,
595, 358 A.2d 609 (1976».
The court then evaluated the facts and
circumstances surrounding Lockett and
Houck's levels of inebriation after the accident. Initially, it was determined that
Lockett had been drinking from approximately 6:45 p.m. to 8:15 p.m. on the evening of the accident. A blood specimen
was taken from Ms. Lockett in conjunction with routine hospital procedure.
Although the specimen was not taken for
the purpose of determining blood alcohol
content, an expert testified that a person
with Lockett's ethyl alcohol content probably had a blood alcohol level "approximately in the range of .11 to .12 percent
[by weight]." Id. There was no testimony
in addition to the blood test as to Lockett's
demeanor, appearance, or conduct, which
might have provided any indicia of
drunkeness. Id. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1120.
The court determined that while the evidence was sufficient to determine that
Lockett was "under the influence," the
evidence was not sufficient to prove that
she was "intoxicated." Id. (Note: This
decision was rendered before the July 1,
1988 legislative enactment lowering the
blood alcohol level of intoxication from
.13 to .10.)
As opposed to the facts and circumstances regarding Lockett, the court
did not have the benefit of a sample of
Houck's blood or breath. Houck, who
refused tests necessary to determine blood
alcohol content, denied consumption of
alcohol on the night of the accident. His
testimony, however, was discounted by
statements of the investigating police officer, a paramedic, the medical doctor who
treated him at the hospital, and a nurse,
each of whom testified that Houck smelled
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of alcohol. The aforementioned witnesses
characterized Houck as uncooperative,
combative, hostile, and belligerent.
Another paramedic stated that Houck "appeared to be intoxicated - he smelled of
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, all he could
do was moan, 'he could not converse.'" Id.
In short, it was the considered opinion of
those in contact with Houck after the accident that Houck consumed alcohol to the
extent that his normal coordination, faculties, and physical and mental abilities were
substantially and materially impaired. Id.
The trial judge, in consideration of the
foregoing evidence, submitted the case to
the jury on the question of the "proximate
cause of this accident ... " and "the compensatory damage aspects," but had "a
serious problem sending it on punitive
damages." The trial judge determined that,
as a matter of law, neither Lockett, nor
Houck exhibited such a wanton and reckless disregard for human life as would permit him to submit the question of punitive
damages to the jury. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at
1121.
The court of appeals, then considered
the requisite conditions for the imposition
of punitive damages:"

appeals did hold, however, that a finding
by the jury that Houck was intoxicated
would have been sufficient to infer that he
exhibited a wanton or reckless disregard
for human life, thus justifying an award of
punitive damages. The facts and circumstances surrounding Houck's behavior
were sufficient to indicate outrageous conduct. The lower court erred, therefore, in
keeping from the jury the issued of
punitive damages. Id.
The holding in Lockett v. Nast reinforces
legislation responding to the public sentiment for more stringent penalties against
those who operate motor vehicles while
intoxicated. Thus, punitive awards will be
made available to an increasing number of
drunk driving victims. The court warned,
however, that "[t]he step we take today recognizing that one who drinks to the
point of becoming intoxicated and then
undertakes the operation of a motor vehicle may be found to have had a wanton disregard for human life - is not an
invitation to claim punitive damages in
any case where negligence and drinking
can be shown." Id. at 370, 539 A.2d at 1127
(emphasis added).

-Jules R. Bricker
We think that in civil automobile accident cases involving a drinking driver
whether the driver had a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life, in
the operation of an automobile, is to
be tested by a sliding scale. As the
degree of impairment by the voluntary
consumption of alcohol increases, the
need for other aggravating circumstances lessens, and visa versa.

Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. The court
opined that the act of outrageous driving,
as well as the act of driving after the point
of voluntary intoxication, permitted the
inference that the driver did not care
whether he killed or injured others. The
court clarified that "[w ]hat must not be
forgotten is that the discretion to award
punitive damages becomes available only
when the combination of relevant facts
demonstrates by a preponderance of the
evidence that the driver had a wanton or
reckless disregard for human life." Id. at
363, 539 A.2d at 1123. Thus, individuals
who drive negligently, but not outrageously, and who have not consumed alcohol
beyond the point of intoxication are not
subject to punitive damages. Id.
The court concluded that regarding
Lockett's case, the judge did not err in
withholding the issue of punitive damages
from the jury since, as a matter of law, the
facts were not sufficient to indicate that
she was legally intoxicated. The court of

Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership: JUDICIARY'S
ABILITY TO A WARD ATTORNEY'S

FEES LIMITED
In Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth
Assocs. 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175
(1988) the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that the Circuit Court for
Carroll County abused its discretion by
imposing attorney's fees against the Legal
Aid Bureau under Md. Rule 1-341. The
court reasoned that Legal Aid produced
factual issues for the consideration of the
fact-finder and that the judge was clearly
erroneous in finding that Legal Aid was
motivated by "bad faith" and a "lack of
substantial justification." As a result, the
decision by the Circuit Court for Carroll
County was reversed.
The case revolved around a landlordtenant suit brought in the District Court
for Carroll County. In 1981, Josephine
Brunner and Salvatore Torres leased an
apartment at a housing project known as
Bishop's Garth. Three years later, Bishop's
Garth sought restitution of the premises
by bringing an action against Brunner and
Torres, claiming breach of their lease.
Through their counsel, the Legal Aid
Bureau, the tenants requested a jury trial.
The jury found in favor of the landlord.

When the defendants' appeal was dismissed for procedural reasons, Bishop's Garth
filed for and was granted attorney's fees
under Md. Rule 1-341.
In its opinion, the court of special
appeals drew particular attention to a
meeting between a Legal Aid attorney and
the managing general partner of Bishop's
Garth. The Legal Aid lawyer requested
photostats of other tenants' complaints
against Brunner and Torres, along with
pictures showing Brunner and Torres's
children damaging the housing project's
property. When denied this information,
the Legal Aid attorney allegedly
announced, "I'm sure you know that we
can stretch this thing out. ... Based on
that fact, don't you think it might be to
your advantage to come to some agreement with Mrs. Brunner and - save yourself some money?" Id. at 219, 540 A.2d at
fi77. In a footnote, the court referred to
The Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Code of Professional Conduct. They then commented
that there was no doubt that the lawyer's
"somewhat tactless remarks" inspired the
plaintiffs request for punitive measures
pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. Id. at 219, 540
A.2d at 1178.
Maryland Rule 1-341, which corresponds with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, declares
In any civil action, if the court finds
that the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding
was in bad faith or without substantial
justification, the court may require the
offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or both of them to pay
to the adverse party the costs of the
proceeding and the reasonable
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.
Rule 1-341's "bad faith" requirement
encompasses the notion that before sanctions can be applied, one must act "for
purposes of delay." Blanton v. Equitable
Bank, 61 Md. App. 158, 163, 485 A.2d 694
(1985).
The court of special appeals was disturbed by the trial judge's finding that the
tenants' indulgence in a jury trial and
subsequent appeal was not in good faith
and bereft of substantial justification. The
trial judge expounded that the request for
a jury trial was motivated by a desire for
delay in order to unduly coerce Bishop's
Garth to dismiss the action. Md. Rule 1341, however, is inapplicable to justifiable
delays, especially if the behavior causing
the delay concerns the assertion of a fundamental right. Legal Aid, 540 A.2d at
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